Increased Airline Safety, Who Really Pays? An Economic Analysis of the Recently Proposed Airline Safety Regulations
LegalBrief Law Journal Issue 1, Article 3
cite as: Steve Balk, Increased Airline Safety, Who Really
Pays? An Economic Analysis of the Recently Proposed Airline Safety Regulations, 1
LegalBrief L.J. 3, par. # (1997)
<http://www.LegalBrief.com/balk.html> Click here for information on citing on-line journals |
Increased Airline Safety, Who Really Pays? An Economic Analysis of the Recently Proposed Airline Safety Regulations |
SIDENOTES LegalBrief Sidenote Citation (2nd ed. 2003) |
By Steve Balk
I. Introduction
{1} Imagine yourself waiting interminable hours to board your international flight to Europe. The wait is due to the increased security measures due to the threat of terrorism, but still you are uneasy that even these new security measures will not be enough to deter potential terrorists. In addition, the time spent in line is wasted time, during which you cannot be productive to your business. {2} You, the traveler, must balance the increased time and cost of traveling against the necessity of travel. If you found that there was a different, lower security airline on which you could travel more cheaply, would you choose the cheaper alternative and risk your security? Possibly you the traveler will choose to abstain entirely from traveling, instead using the ever-more sophisticated forms of communication to complete your business work. The analysis of which choice consumers will make as a whole, and the effect on the airlines and government, is a subject this Note will examine using the discipline of law and economics. {3} This Note will discuss, using the discipline of
law and economics as a framework, various proposals for increasing the safety
of airline travel.1 The Note will examine, in turn, the workings of
each form of enhanced security and then will discuss the application of law and
economics analysis to the proposed security improvements.2 Finally,
this Note will draw conclusions about the economic ramifications of the
improvements.3
II. Law and Economics
A. Supply and Demand
{4} The theory of law and economics encompasses a vast array of real world topics. "[E]conomics is the science of rational choice in the world--our world--in which resources are limited in relation to human wants."4 The scarcity of resources is a given in economics, and federal funding for any project is a resource. {5} The discipline assumes that "man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions--what we shall call his 'self-interest.'"5 This behavior need not rise to the level of conscious choice, for the behavior may be unconscious or assumed to be chosen.6 Finally, self-interest should not be confused with selfishness, for the interests of other people may well be a part of one's own self-interest.7 Having summarized the discipline's view of man, it is necessary to turn to the fundamental principles of economics. {6} The first principle is known as the Law of Demand.8 When the price of a good rises relative to other goods, a rational consumer will look to substitute less preferred goods that are now more inexpensive. Many consumers will prefer the good, even at its raised price, but others will substitute other goods which are cheaper. As a result, the total quantity demanded by consumers will decrease: {7} Dollars are shown on the vertical axis, increasing upward. The units demanded are shown on the horizontal axis, increasing to the right. A rise in price from p1 to p2 results in a reduction in the quantity demanded, from q1 to q2. Inversely, when quantity supplied falls, the effect is to raise the price.9
1. The Law of Demand
{8} The Law of Demand is not limited in applicability to goods with explicit prices.10 "Unpopular teachers sometimes try to increase class enrollment by raising the average grade of the students in their classes; for, other things being equal, hard graders have smaller class enrollments than easy graders."11 These types of nonpecuniary prices, or prices which are not measured in money, are called "shadow prices" by economists.12 {9} A second law is that consumers are assumed to be trying to maximize their utility, which may be interpreted as happiness, profit, or pleasure.13 When sellers or buyers of goods with a pecuniary price are involved, it is customary to speak of "profit maximization" rather than utility maximization.14 Sellers seek to maximize the difference between their sales costs and revenues, but for the moment, one must consider the lowest price that a seller for which he would be willing to part with his goods. The minimum is the "price that the resources consumed in making the seller's product would command in their next best use," that is an alternate use for which the seller could achieve a profit.15 A corollary of the notion of alternative price is that the cost may only be incurred when someone else is denied use of the resource.16
2. Price and Cost
{10} An "opportunity cost" to the economist is the cost of using a good in such a way that the benefit of an alternative use is denied to another.17 Economics is really about resources, "with money merely being a claim on those resources."18 The economist must distinguish between transfers that affect the use of resources, which is where the rights to use a scarce resource change hands, and the transactions in which merely money changes hands, called transfer payments.19 A transfer of purely money may diminish the purchase power of one, but it should increase the purchase power of another by an equal amount.20 "Put differently, it would be a private cost, but not a social one. A social cost diminishes the wealth of society, a private cost merely rearranges the wealth."21 Those who wish to maximize the aggregate wealth of society are thus unconcerned with private costs, for any income distribution should contain the same amount of wealth, however social costs must be minimized thereby maximizing society's wealth. {11} The forces of competition tend to make
opportunity cost the maximum as well as the minimum price for a given
good.22 "A price above opportunity cost is a magnet drawing
resources into the production of the good until the increase in output drives
price, by the Law of Demand, down to the level of cost."23
Equilibrium means a stable point, and the equilibrium occurs when the amount
supplied and demanded are equal, due to similar prices demanded and payable. At
equilibrium, there is no incentive for sellers to alter price or
output.24
B. Government Regulation
{12} If some arbitrary limit is imposed on the
market, the natural equilibrium will be disturbed, and a new equilibrium will
be established, albeit one that will not reflect true opportunity costs. For
example, suppose that the government imposed a price ceiling, a cap of cost
below the equilibrium price: {13} As a result of the market intervention, P will
now intersect the supply curve to the left of the demand curve, meaning that
supply will fall short of demand.25 Equilibrium will eventually be
reestablished, whether it be through waiting periods for the goods, or a black
market in the regulated good.26 In establishing market controls,
governments may not always be entirely rational actors.27
C. The Free Market and the Rational Actor
{14} The third basic principle of economics is that
resources tend to gravitate toward their most valuable uses if voluntary
exchange is permitted.28 In a free market, both parties enter into
the exchange because each feels he is receiving more for his property than it
is worth, otherwise the exchange would not occur.29 By a process of
voluntary exchange, resources are shifted to those uses in which the highest
value to consumers, as measured by their willingness to pay, is
achieved.30 Resources are said to be employed efficiently when their
value is highest.31 A rational actor may also place a price on
life.32 With this background in economics, this Note will now turn
to a description of several proposed security measures.
III. A History of Airline Safety Regulation
{15} In 1956, following public outcry to regulate
flying safety after a crash between United and TWA flights over the Grand
Canyon cost the lives of 128 people, Congress created the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).33 The FAA was given the task of regulating air
traffic control and airline safety.34 Recently, events have caused
this agency to issue recommendations for improved airline safety.35
A. The Beginning of the Need
{16} The airline industry was largely unregulated with regard to physical security, until the early 1970's.36 During its lifetime, the airline industry has greatly expanded, and this trend will continue.37 There are now 20,000 scheduled flights each day in the United States.38 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts 2.1 million domestic passengers per day by the year 2007, up from the current 1.5 million.39 This growing number of passengers in the same amount of airspace must lead to larger planes, thus a greater cost for each airline crash or sabotage.40 {17} The recent disasters involving ValuJet and
Trans World Airlines have prompted heightened scrutiny and calls for more
regulation or at least increased spending on safety.41 However,
there are limits to the security which finite amounts of money may purchase.
"When you're dealing with the highly innovative malevolence of humans," there
is no dollar amount that will buy complete safety.42 Complete safety
is not economically efficient, and therefore not desirable.43
B. Reactions to Terrorism
{18} On September 10, 1996, President Clinton asked Congress to authorize more than $1 billion in new spending to counteract threats against the American public.44 His proposal would "commit the government in the short term to expanding markedly its financial and operational role in assuring airline security in the name of overall national security."45 However, the plan assumes that airlines will eventually pick up the bulk of the security costs. The administration said that over time the commercial airline industry would be expected to bear a significant fraction of the costs, perhaps running to billions of dollars.46 {19} The proposal includes "immediate background security checks for workers with access to secure areas, [and] starting a test program to match each piece of luggage with its passenger on all domestic flights...."47 Among other areas of emphasis, this proposal would also increase "profiling" of passengers.48 Profiling involves assessing the probabilities of certain suspects to act in certain manners. {20} In addition to the three areas of proposed regulation, this Note will also examine the proposed use of "sniffers" to detect the presence of plastic explosives. The bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 helped to raise public awareness of plastic explosives.49 However the current system of x-raying baggage is vulnerable to plastic explosives, which will not register on a metal detector and are difficult to detect X-ray machines.50 The proposed new system for detecting plastic explosives utilizes the "medical CT-scan technology."51 {21} Finally, the FAA and various outside safety experts have called for the airlines and airports to attract better personnel to man the security systems. Most security personnel can be considered low-skilled.52 However, the cost of training and maintaining this army is considered high by the airports and airlines.
1. Security Background Checks on Employees
{22} Under the President's recommendations,
discussed by his new Aviation Safety and Security Commission, employees with
access to secured areas would be subject to criminal background
investigations.53 This measure would subject airline and airport
employees to the same checks as for example, day-care providers
have.54 However, this proposal is limited to workers; there is yet
no attempt to broaden background checks to passengers.
2. Luggage Matching
{23} The proposal to match luggage utilizes experimental technology.55 Micron Communications, Inc. is one leading company in the fast growing field of security technology.56 However, even Micron's security products remain generally untested under field conditions.57 {24} The proposed system would encode computer chips
with information about travelers, including their name, destination, flight
number, and originating airport.58 The airlines would place an
identical chip in the tag accompanying each piece of baggage.59 Upon
boarding, the passengers and their luggage would be matched using radio
technology.60 If a suitcase or other piece of baggage is found on
the plane without an accompanying passenger, the luggage would be quickly
removed and inspected.
3. Increased Profiling
{25} Profiling involves the use of data to form a
picture of a suspicious passenger; one who fits at least some of the
characteristics of a terrorist.61 The names, addresses, phone
numbers, travel histories and billing records of passengers would be run
through a database, controlled by a federal government agency, that might lead
to a search of luggage of those deemed suspicious.62 This
necessarily raises privacy concerns.63 Previously, no national
system had existed; the airport security agencies operated
alone.64
4. Plastic Explosives Detection
{26} In 1990, Congress mandated that the Federal
Aviation Administration develop new technology to detect plastic
explosives.65 InVision Technologies, a California company has become
the only company to achieve FAA certification for a plastic-bomb detection
system.66 Despite the limitations of metal detectors and x-ray
machines, they are some airports' only line of inadequate defense against
plastic explosives. InVision's CTX machine, however, can detect "tiny amounts
of plastic explosive."67 Unfortunately, the machines cost about $1
million apiece and have a low capacity in terms of bags being slowly
processed.68 5. Increased Wages and Training for Security Personnel {27} People must operate the security machines. No matter how sophisticated the machine, somebody has to sit by the machine and make a decision.69 The more sophisticated the machine, the better the capability needed to operate it." {28} Unfortunately, these types of jobs are often
considered "dead-end" or low prestige positions. This means that these
positions are unlikely to attract the more intelligent and motivated kinds of
people necessary for good security work. An increase in pay and training might
remedy some of these deficiencies.
IV. An Economic Analysis of the Proposed Regulations
{29} An in-depth cost and benefit analysis of all
the proposals is impossible at this time. The proposals are just that, and
their effectiveness cannot yet be judged. However, the merits of each
individual idea may be subjected to a law and economics analysis, that is to an
understanding of the costs and benefits involved, even without an exact dollar
amount.
A. Generally
{30} All the costs of these proposed measures must
be borne by some party, the airlines (and thus airline passengers), airline
passengers directly, or the government (and thus taxpayers). If the passengers
are directly affected, say by a change in the ticket price or increased waiting
time, this will change the price from p1 to p2 and thus lessen demand for
airline service from d1 to d2.70 On the other hand, if the cost is
borne by the government and the taxpayers, little change in demand is likely.
The payment is made by a larger population and in a method by which the
taxpayer does not notice the higher price for the product.
1. Security Background Checks on Employees
{31} The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of "unreasonable searches and seizures."71 However, barring other contractual or legal restrictions, there seems little limit on the background checks that an employer may perform on an employee. The President has proposed increased background checks on employees as a means of deterring further terrorism.72 That measure's effectiveness may be limited according to a law and economics analysis. {32} Assume a hypothetical airline has instituted a complete background check in accordance with the President's recommendations. Further, this check obviously may only determine what actions the employee has taken in the past. If an employee is judged suspect, he will not be hired. What will the practical effect be on a terrorist? {33} These measures will increase the cost of an employee being the responsible party for planting a bomb or committing some form of terrorist attack. A theoretically thorough background check would determine which employees would have terrorist connections, so any help from an employee would have to be gained after the employee was hired. This would force the terrorist to expend resources on recruitment of airline employees, possibly resulting in a change of attack methods.73 A terrorist may decide that another method of attack would result in less risk, or have a lower cost. Thus instituting background checks will lead an economically rational terrorist to target another airline. {34} Viewing the problems from the airlines' perspective, a complete background check may force a higher wage for airline employees.74 If the pool of possible airline employees is limited, any attempt to shrink the pool would result in a smaller supply of employees, and thus a larger relative demand for those employees which remain qualified. As shown above, this will result in a higher price (wage) being paid for each employee.75 {35} Finally, under a law and economics analysis, any employee who survives the background check will be in a better position than he would have been had there been no checks at all.76 Because the pool is limited, any reductions will result in an increased wage for the employee.77 This is based on an unrealistic assumption of a fixed labor pool.78 {36} The security measure of completing background
checks on employees will likely increase the costs to terrorists of using
airline employees in their attacks, leading to the choice of a different means
of attack. Employees who pass the test will benefit to an extent. Airlines will
pay higher prices for workers, so the cost must be borne by the government or
passengers.
2. Luggage Matching
{37} Luggage matching, as explained above, forces the airlines to ensure that the passenger matched with the bag boards the plane before his luggage is set aboard.79 The drawbacks of this system include increased cost and delay. As a benefit, if the system works as intended, it should stop all non-suicidal terrorists from planting bombs in their luggage. {38} An analysis of this system, assuming only the waiting time is varied, must determine if this measure should be mandated or if the airlines should be given free rein to implement it as they see fit. Of all the proposed measures, the one with the most dramatic impact is luggage matching, because it will affect all passengers.80 If the plan is fully implemented, airlines would have to match millions of bags each day, an error regarding any one of which could cause hours of delays.81 {39} A simpler solution would allow the airlines to match the bags as they saw fit.82 Given that a change of plan or a mistake by any passenger might delay the flight, consumers may soon wish they could choose whether to accept the costs of the inevitable delays.83 Consumers could also gauge the impact of the safety measures on their perceived safety by weighing the costs and benefits using the Hand Formula.84 {40} Consumer have indicated they prefer to do without the frills on domestic flights. Note the rapid expansion of discount carriers such as Southwest Air at the expense of the mainstream, more expensive airlines. The only variable is the price consumers are willing to pay for the increased safety offered by luggage matching.85 {41} From the airlines' point of view, luggage
matching produces many costs. Because one passenger may negligently delay a
flight, causing money to be spent as the plane waits on the runway, airlines
will likely spend much money on advertising the system, hoping to change
consumer behavior.86 An airline which unilaterally implemented
luggage matching may gain some passengers, but its expenses would rise
dramatically without similarly increased revenue. For this reason, airlines are
likely to wish for a government mandate which would make the system mandatory,
so that no competitor could cut costs by refusing to implement the luggage
matching system.
3. Increased Profiling
{42} Perhaps no part of the proposed regulations has been criticized as much as the proposal which calls for increased profiling of passengers.87 Profiling is commonplace in the search for drugs, although it has not gone unchallenged in the courts.88 The purpose of the profiling proposed here is merely to narrow the number of bags which airline employees must intensely scrutinize.89 This profiling would reduce the amount of money needed for the purchase of bomb detection equipment. {43} A law and economic analysis of the searches may use the Hand Formula to determine to what extent the searches need be regulated.90 Another criticism of profiling is that the profiles may be skewed toward certain racial or ethnic groups.91 Support has also been forthcoming for the proposal from travel groups.92 {44} Under a law and economic approach, the alleged discrimination in the profiles may be justified. If hypothetically the profiles omitted certain likely racial groups, the benefits of this decision would accrue only to the affected minority, but the costs would be borne by the majority and also the minority.93 Another factor is the cost of information. To the extent that some attribute is correlated with the existence of a certain characteristic, it is rational for people to use the visible attribute as a proxy for information about the more expensive to discover characteristic.94 Thus, it would be economically efficient to discriminate against a certain class of people who are likely to be criminals since determining if each individual in the group is a criminal would be much more expensive. {45} Even discriminatory profiling may be justified
because the costs of obtaining individual information is much greater than the
costs imposed by searches based on a profile. While no one will object to
stopping terrorism, many may object to a discriminatory profiling system. Both
moral and constitutional objections may be raised. However, constitutional law
is beyond the scope of this note--the practice is economically
efficient.
4. Plastic Explosives Detection
{46} The analysis of explosives detection is rather simple. If the cost of implementing the system is less than the benefits of the system, airports should purchase the detection equipment.95 X-ray detection technology is already in widespread use in the nation's airports, with little complaint from passengers. {47} This is likely to be a hidden cost, as the
federal government pays for the initial equipment, with the airports taking
over the operation in the long term.96 A better method would be to
include a security surcharge on each ticket, allowing consumers to appreciate
the true costs of safety. Under the plan by which general revenue funds would
pay for the equipment, the benefits are spread to those who use the airlines,
while the cost is borne by all. This may lead to a misallocation of resources,
as no one directly pays for the security, so no market can be established as to
how much security the public desires. This situation may call for the
government to act to combat allocative inefficiencies.
5. Increased Wages and Training for Security Personnel
{48} The personnel who are directly responsible for passenger security--those who screen the luggage--are often poorly motivated and compensated. A recent FAA study noted widespread problems with security personnel training.97 Under the Federal Aviation Act, airlines are responsible for screening passengers and luggage.98 This often results in airlines contracting out this service to the lowest bidder, which results in low-paid employees.99 {49} Upgrading employee training and compensation
will result in increased costs for travelers. Barring a government takeover of
airport security, the airlines must improve security at their own
expense.100 As costs increase, demand will decrease, unless more
passengers are willing to travel due to the apparent increased
safety.101
B. Possible Secondary Effects
{50} As more money is spent on preventative
measures, terrorists will presumably spend more time and money to overcome
these countermeasures, an example of rent-seeking. However, terrorists may also
move their attacks to other forms of transportation or structures. As the Vice
President acknowledged, "There is no silver bullet. We're facing new
challenges, and we have to come up with new responses."102 The costs
of air travel and the time involved will certainly increase. Travelers may
choose to travel less by air given the worries that accompany this mode of
travel. However, even economists may be uncertain as to the effects of certain
measures.103
V. Conclusion
{51} Terrorists have forced consumers everywhere to pay more for security and countermeasures, not to mention lost opportunities. While few would dispute the need for increased security, there may be more efficient methods of delivering the same product--a safe airline trip. Security background checks on employees may be justified economically, but continued vigilance over employee contacts is prohibitively expensive. Luggage matching will deter at least one form of attack, but will certainly result in great costs in time and effort. Increased passenger profiling can be justified on its general effectiveness, despite those who question its fairness. Greater explosives detection should be implemented if the cost of the machines is less than the benefit they produce. Finally, increased wages and training will certainly result in increased effectiveness for airline security personnel, but the consumer may not be willing to pay the price. As the war on terrorism continues, America needs to implement tighter security measures, but these measures should not be adopted without analysis of the costs and benefits involved. |
1. See infra part III.B. 2. See infra part IV.A. 3. See infra part IV.B. 4. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3 (4th ed. 1992). Posner is known as a member of the Chicago school of law and economics, the leading school of thought for law and economics theory. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Reconstructing the Sherman Act of 1890: Law, Economics, and the Ethic of Industry and Restraint, __. 5. Id. In a related footnote, Posner writes, "Throughout this book, the 'masculine' pronouns are used in a generic rather than a gendered sense." Id. at 2. This author will follow the same convention. 4. Id. at 4. This point may well provoke debate, that while an actor may choose to act in his own self-interest, he is not consciously choosing to do so. However, that philosophical question is beyond the scope of this Note. For a different perspective, see Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. Pol. Econ 877 (1991). 5. Posner, supra note 4, at 4. 6. Id. 7. Id. Posner further notes that this analysis assumes that the only change occurring in the system is the change in relative price or in quantity. Posner, supra note 4, at 4. Yet if, for example, demand were increasing at the same time that the price was rising, the quantity demanded might not fall; it may even rise. Id. This analysis also assumes away the possible impact of a change in relative price on incomes. Such a change might have a feedback effect on the quantity demanded. Id. at 4, 5. This may be ignored, for the feedback effects of a change in price of a single item are usually quite minimal. Id. at 5. 8. Id. 9. Posner, supra note 4, at 6 10. Id. 11. Id. Others have argued that laws generally should reflect a societal desire for the maximization of wealth. See Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 401 (1965). 12. Posner, supra note 4, at 6. 13. Id. Of course, if no alternate use exists, the price of the original product may be driven to zero. However, costs of a product must include labor, so that a product which could only be sold for nothing would not be produced, so the seller would still have the use of his time. 14. Id. Posner uses the illustration of breathing air. Because he may breathe as much air as he wants without depriving anyone else of the right to breathe as much air as the third party wants, no one will pay him to breathe less air. Id. 15. Id. Posner utilizes the following illustrations: The major cost of higher education is the foregone earnings that one would have earned if he were working rather than attending school. Those earnings may well exceed the cost of college. Also, supposing that a barrel of oil sells for only two dollars, but in ten years it will sell for 20 dollars, the "producer who holds on to his oil for the" future realizes the two dollars of lost profit now as an opportunity cost. Posner, supra note 4, at 4. 16. Id. 17. Id. Posner notes that: Housework is an economic activity, even if the houseworker is a spouse who
does not receive pecuniary compensation; it involves cost- primarily the
opportunity cost of the houseworker's time.... In contrast, the transfer by
taxation from me to a poor (or to a rich) person would be costless in itself;
regardless of its effects on his and my incentives.... It would not diminish my
stock of resources. Id. 18. Of course, this assumes that transfer costs are negligible, an assumption utilized throughout this Note. 19. Id. at 7. 20. Posner, supra note 4, at 8. 21. Id. Competition will not drive price below opportunity cost, for then no rational seller will produce the product but will instead divert his resources and time to the production and sale of alternate goods. This will result in fewer goods being available and a higher price for those goods. 22. Id. 23. Id. 24. Id. at 10. As to how the equilibrium will be reestablished,
Posner notes: 25. See Philip Jones & John Cullis, Legitimate and Illegitimate Transfers: Dealing with "Political" Cost-Benefit Analysis, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 247 (1996) in which the authors note that governments often may consider the self-interest of the government or its employees, and not just the interest of the public, when making cost-benefit calculations. Id. at 254. 26. Posner, supra note 4, at 10. This is not to imply that a resource's most valuable use is necessarily its best use morally, just economically. Some advocates of this school have argues that all common law is an application of law and economics, existing to maximize the aggregation of wealth. See Wetlaufer, supra note 1, at 7. A non-critical application law and economics may lead to so-called "moral monstrosities." For familial law and economics, see Michael J. Trebilock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and economic Perspective, 41 U. Toronto L. J. 533 (1991). 27. Posner, supra note 4, at 10. A rational actor may have emotional value attached to some property which would prohibit its transfer. For example, I might value an object for sentimental reasons and refuse to sell it at a objective fair market value. However, the market has functioned, for I have more highly valued the object than the price offered. Objectively, I am worse off, but subjectively, I have gained. 28. Id. at 11. Value may only be measured by the ability and willingness to pay. Without an ability to pay, the resource will not be transferred, and without a willingness to pay, there will be no voluntary transaction. 29. Id. at 11. 30. Mark A. Glick, The Law and Economics of Tort Damages, 9 Utah Bar J. 8 (1996). Economists use two methods to determine what a life is worth: market statistical studies (if a worker faces a 1/1000 increased chance of death at his job and is willing to work for $1000 above a normal job, he values his life at $1,000,000) and contingent valuation surveys (asking each worker how much he would pay to avoid injury or death). Id. 31. Douglas Feaver, A New Route to Safety; The Airline Industry has Changed: So Must the FAA, The Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1996, at A2. 32. Id. 33. See generally, Laurie M. McQuade, Note and Comment,Tragedy as a Catalyst for Reform: The American Way?, 11 Conn. J. Int'l L. 325 (1996). 34. Shirlyce Mannning, Comment, The United States' Response to International Air Safety, 61 J. Air L. & Com. 505, 514 (1996). This was due in part to the absence of terrorist threat and to the need for the FAA to work to prevent accidents. If commercial airliners crashed at the same rate as they did in the 1960s, there would be a crash every 10 days. Feaver, supra note 30, at A8. 35. Id. For example, although the airlines of Braniff, Eastern, and Pan Am have all failed since the deregulation of the 1970s, the number of passengers on boarding U.S. aircraft rose from 302.8 million in 1980 to 540.2 million in 1994. Id. Over that same period, the average domestic fare has fallen, in 1996 dollars, from $158 to $107. Id. Domestic passenger miles traveled during that same period rose 37% for airlines and only 37% for cars. Id. 36. Feaver, supra note 33, at A2. 37. Id. 38. Id. 39. Robert Davis, TWA Crash May Forever be a Mystery, Reno Says, USA Today, Sept. 23, 1996, at 3A. However, the cause of the TWA crash has not yet been established. "Attorney General Janet Reno acknowledged Sunday that officials may never know what felled the plane." Id.; see also Brian Michael Jenkins, The Crash of TWA Flight 800, San Diego Union Trib., Sept. 15, 1996, at G1 (quoting a member of the President's commission on airline safety as stating "The biggest threat we face is keeping bombs off airliners."). 40. Feaver, supra note 33, at A1. 41. Posner, supra note 4, at 163. 42. Todd S. Purdum, $1 Billion Sought for Anti-terrorism Plan, Austin American-Statesman, Aug. 4, 1996, at A1. 43. Id.; see generally, Manning, supra note 36. 44. Purdam, supra note 44, at A1. In the past, airlines and airports have largely handled airport security. Id. 45. Id. 46. Id. This proposal has "raised the hackles of civil liberties groups concerned about privacy violations, and [Vice President Al] Gore has ordered the creation of an advisory group of authorities in to consul on the development of the 'profiling' system to insure it does not violate privacy rights." Id. 47. Charles Boisseau, Improvements Needed to Combat Airline Safety Threat, Houston Chron., Aug. 4, 1996, at 5. See generally Aphrodite Thevos Tsairis, Lessons of Lockerbie, 22 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 31 (1996). 48. Boisseau, supra note 49, at 5. 49. Id. 50. Garry Wills, Road to Airline Safety Must be Paved at Our Expense, Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 5, 1996, at 33. 51. Clinton Pushes Airport Security, The Baltimore Sun, Sept. 10, 1996, at A1; see also Technology to make Airlines Safer Will Carry a High Price Tag, The Omaha World-Herald, Sept. 3, 1996, at 8. 52. Jenkins, supra note 27, at 61. 53. John Tucker, Micron Joins Terrorism Fight, The Idaho Statesman, Aug. 3, 1996, at B1. 54. Id. "The company has entered a cooperative research and development with the federal Aviation Administration to develop a system to match passengers to their bags." Id. 55. Id. 56. Id. 57. Tucker, supra note 55, at B1. 58. Id. 59. Clinton Pushes Airport Security, supra note 53, at A1. 60. Id. 61. See infra part IV.A.3. 62. Manning, supra note 36, at 529. 63. Boisseau, supra note 49, at A1. 64. Id. 65. Id. 66. Id. 67. Id. 68. As discussed in part II.B, supra. Airline travel may be a somewhat inelastic market, that is, a certain amount of travelers will continue flying despite nearly any cost. However, many passengers will choose to take alternative forms of transportation or not travel at all should airlines prices, in money or time, increase. 69. U.S. Const. amend IV. 70. See supra Part II.B.1. Any law and economics analysis would be incomplete without stating the theory that the free market could solve the problem without interference by the government. If consumers were given a choice as to which airlines had implemented which security measures (and airlines were free to implement whatever measures they saw proper) the consumer could choose to purchase the amount and type of security his risk aversion allowed. This would not appear to be a case in which government interference is warranted. Posner, supra note 4, at 519. 71. Note here the risk to a terrorist of contacting a presumably unknown airline employee. The terrorist must place a value on the role of the employee and compare the cost spent in recruitment. Only if the value is higher than the cost will the terrorist consider contacting the employee. Of course, the cost must also factor in the possibility of the employee turning the terrorist over to law enforcement. 72. The costs of actually doing the search will have to be borne by somebody. Airlines may search individually, have the government search for them, or search under some collective grouping. Posner, supra note 4, at 109: Although information once obtained may be cheap to convey to another person,
it is often not cheap to obtain; and if we do not allow people to profit from
information by keeping it to themselves, they will have less or no incentive to
obtain it in the first place, and society will be the loser. 73. See part II.B, supra (discussing the effects of government interference in the marketplace). 74. Of course, any employee who fails to pass the security clearance will be in a worse position. 75. However, if the wage differential grows too large, more applicants will enter the employee pool, driving down wages as the supply of workers (and presumably those who would pass the background checks) increases. 76. The labor pool is not fixed in size on the macroeconomic level, meaning that all workers could decide to enter the airline industry, if the benefits were sufficiently raised. 77. See supra part III.B.2. 78. Roberto Suro, U.S. Government to Assume Primary Responsibility for Airport Security, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1996, at A03. "The flying public would most directly be affected by a plan that would prohibit any domestic flight from taking off if a passenger checks a bag and then fails to board the airplane." Id. 79. Around 1.5 million passengers board flights at American airports each day. William S. Cohen, Known Danger Zones, Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 1996, at A19. 80. However, this may result in friction among the airlines as many flights connect with each other, and the airlines must transfer luggage. If a bag with a missing passenger passed from an airline which does not screen to an airline which screens, the latter airline would have to delay its flight, so the passengers on the latter flight would not realize that the first airline was making them wait. This is a problem of accountability, or hidden costs in the system. 81. Suro, supra note 80, at A03. Such rules are already in place for international flights and have produced longer check-in times and delays. Id. 82. Posner, supra note 4, at 368 describes the law
and economic approach to negligence using Hand's formula: In the instant case, consumer damages may be the costs of delays (cost of time) or the cost of not having matching when an explosion results. Because the potential for liability is larger (though much rarer) in the latter situation, airlines would move to screen all bags in the absence of regulation exempting them from liability for not screening bags. The Hand Formula dictates that negligence occurs when PL>B and P is probability of the injury occurring, L is damage from the injury, and B is the cost of the preventive measure. Id. Airlines would not be negligent for not screening bags when the costs of screening exceeds the cost of the incident multiplied by the probability of an incident 83. In an industry poll, 80% of National Business Travel Association members were "concerned about the current levels of airport and airways security." Tom Beldon, How Much Will You Pay for Safer Air Travel?, Phil. Inquirer, Aug. 19, 1996, at 14. However, only 10% stated their employees were postponing international travel because of safety concerns. Id. In other surveys conducted at the conference, "most" were willing to pay higher prices and endure longer waits to insure greater safety; but only 24% of respondents indicated that they would be willing to wait for more than two hours for increased security. Id. However, 75% of the respondents said their company would travel less if costs rose more than 10% as a result of higher airfares or security surcharges. Id. 84. The airlines would incur may costs including: the pay for staff which must work longer hours, often in unproductive waiting; the direct costs of the matching system; the opportunity costs from having idle equipment; and the possible costs of delaying connecting flights. 85. Suro, supra note 80 at A03. "Numerous legal issues still need to be resolved, including thorny civil liberties questions such as whether the airlines would be given access to information from government computer systems like those containing criminal data." Id. 86. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that reasonable suspicion may be required to stop suspected drug couriers); See also Elise Bjorkan Clare, et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 84 Geo. L.J. 743 (1996). 87. Suro, supra note 80, at A03. As part of the plan, government agencies are to help develop a sophisticated database which will scrutinize all passengers to determine which passengers' baggage should be examined by bomb detection equipment. Id. No figures are available as to the proposed cost or feasibility of such a measure. 88. Posner, supra note 4, at 682. Ideally, police should not conduct searches when their social cost exceeds their social benefit. Under the Hand Formula, a search is reasonable if the cost of the search in impaired privacy (B) is less than the probability that without the search the criminal will be able to commit his act (P) multiplied by the social cost of allowing the act to occur (L). Id. As the search becomes more intrusive, the stakes of the crime must grow greater to justify the social cost of the search. Id. 89. See, U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (Marshall, J. dissenting). The names, addresses, phone numbers, travel histories, and billing records of passengers would be run through a database which might lead to a luggage search of those deemed suspicious. Clinton Pushes Airline Safety, supra note 53, at 1A. 90. The President of Woodside Travel Trust, an alliance of 4,000 travel agencies said, "I think that some travelers may be offended. However, it's prudent.... [i]f the cost of making the sky safe is an intrusion of very low magnitude, that not too high a price." Clinton Pushes Airline Safety, supra note 53, at 1A. 91. Posner, supra note 4, at 658. The minority pays through cases in which a racially based profile system would have stopped an attack. The direct cost to the minority would be to any passengers on the plane; the indirect cost would be from the prejudice which would not have happened had the attack been prevented. 92. Id. Although the airport security may be foregoing the complete details for the groups in the profile who are not terrorists, the opportunity cost may be lower than the information cost that extensive sampling of the minority group might entail. 93. According to congressional estimates, installing bomb detection systems in the nation's 75 busiest airports would cost $1.5 to 3 billion. Suro, supra note 80, at A03. Actual economic costs to the nation must later include the value of time spent waiting at the airport for the bags to clear. 94. Id. 95. Cohen, supra note 81, at A19. In the past two years, the FAA opened 22 investigations of screener training involving 17 airlines; at least 18 of these cases included allegations of falsified training records. Id. 96. Id. 97. Other nations, including Israel, assign government employees to the screening stations and rotate their assignments so that one employee does not only view machine video during his working day. Willis, supra note 52, at 33. 98. See Tsairis, supra note 49. Tsairis notes that the airport systems used for detection of explosives today are dependent on operator ability, but the Secret Service has been willing to train its agents on advanced devices that call for greater expertise, but less manual supervision. Id. at 36. 99. This is the classic supply and demand curve, as discussed in part II, supra. The increased costs for security may result in essentially a new product, as more people desire safety. Thus, the increased training could conceivably not result in decreased demand, but this is rather unlikely, since most passengers will not notice any difference in training or pay for airline security personnel. 100. Suro, supra note 80, at A03. 101. Wayne Eastman, "Everything's Up for Grabs": The Coasean Theory in Game-theoretic Terms, 31 New Eng. L. Rev., 1996. Eastman refers to the uncertainty between two players in a zero-sum game. |